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Abstract 
This article discusses whether the current proliferation of preferential trade 
agreements—the so-called “competitive liberalization”—encourages evolution 
toward multilateral free trade.  It argues that countries pursuing preferential 
trade initiatives are in pursuit of the economic rents resulting from the trade 
diversion associated with trade preference (or discrimination).  By lowering the 
margin of preference, multilateral trade liberalization reduces those rents and is 
likely to be resisted by members of trade-diverting preferential blocs.  Future 
preferential agreements should be designed to be less trade diverting in order to 
be more compatible with the objective of global free trade. 
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Competitive Liberalization or Competitive Diversion? 





An individual country wishing to promote trade is faced with the strategic question of whether to 
opt for the unilateral, the preferential, or the multilateral liberalization route.  In general, there is a 
consensus over the superiority of the multilateral approach.  However, given that the international 
policy dynamics make negotiating a multilateral trade agreement extremely difficult (and that 
domestic politics preclude unilateral liberalization), preferential arrangements have been put 
forward as being a more practical and feasible route to reach broad liberalization.  Preferential 
Trade Arrangements (PTAs) have become an integral part of the trade policy strategy of many 
countries.  They have flourished so rapidly all over the world that nearly all members of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) are now party to at least one arrangement. 
  Departure from GATT/WTO’s “most favored nation” (MFN) principle is allowed under 
specific conditions that are spelled out in Article XXIV of GATT, the 1979 Enabling Clause, and 
Article V of GATS.  As of March 2003, 179 PTAs have been notified to GATT/WTO and are in 
force of which 135 are under Article 24, 19 under the Enabling Clause and 25 under GATS 
Article V.  Figure 1 shows that since the 1990s, the number of PTAs notified to the WTO has 
jumped from 30 to almost 180 (an average rate of 19 PTAs per year).  This contrasts sharply with 
an increase from six to 29 in the 1970s and 1980s (an average rate of one PTA per year).  
As far as the existing economic literature is concerned, there is no guarantee that PTAs 
always benefit their member countries.  In fact, although they can create trade and improve terms 
of trade vis-à-vis non-members, they can also divert trade away from lower-cost producers in   2 
non-member countries.
1  More importantly, PTAs can be harmful to the excluded countries by 
virtue of their discriminatory nature, in terms of both their exports to the PTA market and their 
terms of trade (i.e., they have decrease their export prices in order to remain competitive in the 
preferential market).  This is particularly relevant since many of the recent preferential trade 
initiatives leave out many of the world’s poorest countries.     
 
Figure 1.  Number of PTAs notified to WTO




















































Source: Compiled from WTO. 
 
These potential negative effects—not present in a multilateral (i.e., non discriminatory) 
trade liberalization—have triggered a heated debate regarding the relationship between 
preferential trade agreements and the multilateral trading system.  The so-called “Regionalism 
versus Multilateralism” debate spars those who consider preferential agreements as harmful 
distractions from the multilateral system, against those who believe that they will promote 
                                                 
1  The seminal work on the trade-creation trade-diversion tradeoff is by Viner (1950).   3 
broader global liberalization.
2   
Even high level officials have weighted in on the debate.  For instance, the EU Trade 
Commissioner has argued that multilateralism and regionalism are not mutually exclusive, but 
“are complementary instruments to manage the complexities of an interdependent world.” (Lamy, 
2002).  Similarly, a senior U.S. trade official has argued that PTAs will trigger a “competitive 
liberalization” which could be an alternative route to global free trade as nations compete to open 
their markets to one another.
3  On the other hand, the head of the WTO has recently warned that 
“the present panorama of a criss-crossing web of RTAs” creates a complex network of trade 
regimes, and ultimately poses systemic risk to the global trading system.
4   
  Starting from the general proposition that global welfare is higher under global free trade 
than in a world divided into competing inward-looking blocs, this article focuses on the following 
question: Does the current proliferation of PTAs encourage evolution toward globally free trade, 
or does it place impediments in its way, and perhaps even increase the likelihood of trade wars 
between competing blocs?   This question is tackled from two different but related angles.  The 
first approach (Section 2) investigates whether PTAs have a tendency to expand their 
memberships or to merge, and whether this tendency will continue so as to eventually yield 
global free trade.  The second approach (Section 3) deals with the effects of the establishment of a 
PTA on trade barriers between member and non-member countries.  Section 4 offers some 
concluding insights.    
 
                                                 
2  For a survey of this literature, Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) and Krueger (1999). 
3  “U.S., Singapore Near Pact on Trade Talks Are First of Many Bush Administration Plans to Pursue for 
Bilateral Deals,”  The Washington Post, November 20, 2002.  The term “competitive liberalization” has 
been widely used in APEC dialogue, and was first coined by Bergsten (1996).  He argues for instance that 
the United States initiated the Kennedy Round in the 1960s and the Tokyo Round in the 1970s to counter 
the discrimination inherent in the creation and expansion of the European Community.  
4 Supachai Panitchpakdi, WTO Director General, speech at the Fourth EU-ASEAN Think Tank Dialogue, 
European Parliament, Brussels, 25-26 November 2002 
(http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spsp_e/spsp07_e.htm)   4 
2.  COMPETITIVE LIBERALIZATION”: STAGNANT OR EXPANDING 
MEMBERSHIP? 
 
According to the “competitive liberalization” strategy, PTAs would continue to expand and to 
merge until one single PTA encompassing the whole world is left.  Basically, the fear of being 
excluded from narrower deals can induce non-member countries to join the group or/and to 
accept a broader agreement.  Thus, it is believed, for instance, that NAFTA preferences in the 
U.S. market would encourage other countries in the Western Hemisphere to become part of the 
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), as the FTAA itself would stimulate a multilateral 
round of trade liberalization.   
  This line of reasoning is not new, and has been thoroughly discussed by a number of 
economists under the “domino regionalism” label.
5  Simple political economy models can show 
that, in fact, the expansion of a PTA increases the incentives of the excluded countries to apply 
for membership.
6  The logic is straightforward.  When an outsider country contemplates entry 
into a trading bloc, it faces a trade-off between (i) (increased competition) the costs of opening up 
its own market to the PTA members, and (ii) (preferential access) the gains from obtaining better 
(and preferential) access to the PTA’s market (or, the end of the losses from trade diversion).    
  It can be rigorously shown that the latter part (the market access gain) is always larger as 
long as the aggregate size of the PTA’s market exceeds that of the prospective member.  Given 
that the larger the PTA, the larger an outsider stands to gain from joining (alternatively the larger 
it stands to lose from trade diversion if it remain excluded), the incentive of a non-member 
country to apply for membership increase with the PTA size.  It is therefore very possible that 
                                                 
5  See, for example, Baldwin (1995).  He argues that the recent wave of regionalism was caused by two 
idiosyncratic events (namely, NAFTA and the EC’s 1992 programme) multiplied by a domino effect.  This 
is vividly illustrated by Figure 1.  
6  These models usually have a mercantilist bias (i.e., imports are bad, exports are good) given that 
producers tend to have a larger weight in the government’s objective function.  The arguments presented in 
this section are rigorously supported by a stylized model in Andriamananjara (2002).   5 
outsider countries that initially had no interest in regionalism may become interested when the 
PTA size becomes large enough.
7  Following the same logic, a PTA would keep expanding until 
all countries in the world belong to one super-PTA, which is global free trade.   
  This type of logic, though insightful, tells only one part of the story since it fails to 
consider the incentives of the PTA members for further expansions.  In fact, the formation and the 
expansion of a trading bloc require a “coincidence of wants” among all the interested parties—
members and non-members.  On one hand, the non-members must want to join the PTA while, on 
the other, the members must be willing to accept new members.  A complete theory of 
“competitive liberalization” should therefore look at the incentives of the existing members to 
accept or reject new members, instead of concentrating only on those of the non-members to join 
the PTA.  
  In the real world, PTA members can decide whether or not to allow a new member to 
accede to the bloc.  As a matter of fact, given that Mexico already enjoys privileged access to the 
United States, it may no longer be interested in another expansion of NAFTA. Conceptually, 
when deciding whether to accept or to reject a new member, a representative PTA member 
compares (i) (market enlargement) the gains from getting preferential access to the new 
member’s market; and (ii) (preference dilution) the losses of having to share its original 
preferential market with the new member. 
  One can think of the analogy of a pie getting larger, but at the same time being shared by 
more people.  When the bloc size is small, the gains from market enlargement are large enough to 
offset the losses from the dilution of preferences so that insiders are willing to accept new 
members.  As the bloc expands, however, an insider’s incentives for further PTA expansion 
decrease and eventually go to zero before the PTA encompasses the entire world.  Two 
conclusions emerge. 
                                                 
7  This has been confirmed recently with fervent multilateralists like Japan, Korea, or Singapore becoming 
very active in preferential trading.   6 
•  If PTA membership is selective, (i.e., a PTA grants membership to a new member if and 
only if all existing members agree to admit the new member) the expansion of a PTA will 
fail to lead to global free trade because at some point member countries will refuse to 
accept new members.
8  
•  If the PTA had an open membership policy, PTA expansion would continue until global 
free trade is achieved.      
  Once PTA members decide to reject new applicants, then the excluded/rejected countries 
would have an incentive to create their own PTAs.  This creates the possibility of the coexistence 
of competing trading blocs.  One could then think about a more realistic expansion process 
whereby more than one PTAs form and merge simultaneously to yield progressively larger blocs.  
Will this continue so as to yield one single bloc (i.e., global free trade)?   
The incentives facing the individual PTA members are very similar to those presented 
earlier (i.e., market enlargement and preference dilution).  It can be demonstrated that in this type 
of simultaneous bloc expansion, the regionalism process is likely to fail to converge into a single 
bloc unless the external tariff (between blocs) happens to be low enough.  That is, when the inter-
bloc tariffs are low, the preference margin, which creates trade diversion and discourages bloc 
merger, is also low.  This is an example of open regionalism, based on low external tariffs (not 
necessarily zero), leading to multilateral free trade.  One direct policy implication of this is the 
following. 
•  Global free trade can be achieved through bloc expansion and merger if trading blocs 
lower their external tariffs (not necessarily to zero) at the same time they abolish their 
internal tariffs. 
 
                                                 
8 When the PTA members decide to stop further expansion, the rejected countries have an incentive to form 
their own PTA.  It can be demonstrated that the possibility of a second bloc leads members of the original 
bloc to preempt the losses associated with the creation and enlargement of the second PTA by choosing a 
group size larger than the one they would have chosen if only one bloc was allowed to form.  Hence, the 
threat of regionalism by outsiders would encourage larger PTAs.   7 
3.  PTAS AND INCENTIVES FOR MULTILATERALISM 
 
A second approach in the “Regionalism versus Multilateralism” debate is to directly study the 
effects of the establishment of a PTA on the member countries’ trade policies with respect to non-
members.  Preferential trade policies alter the balance of gains and losses that members and non-
members expect to experience from a MFN reciprocal trade liberalization.  One can easily study 
the effects of regional integration on the incentives of PTA members and non-members to 
undertake multilateral trade liberalization (i.e., reciprocal non-discriminatory trade liberalization 
among member and non-member countries) using the same general concepts used in the previous 
section.
9   
  As an illustration, consider a world with three countries.  Assume that two countries 
establish a PTA, and, while they still keep some tariffs between them, they grant each other 
preferential access relative to the third country.  Note that the key variable of interest here is the 
margin of preference between the PTA members (i.e., how high is the external tariffs relative to 
intra-bloc barriers).  The higher the degree of preference, the higher is the likelihood of trade 
diversion, which tends to benefit PTA producers at the expense of their excluded competitors.
10  
  Consider first the changes in the incentives of a firm in the excluded country to support a 
multilateral deal.  Generally, multilateral trade liberalization increases the firm’s profits in the 
PTA countries markets, but decreases those made in its own domestic market.  When the level of 
discrimination that it faces (or the preference margin that PTA members grant each other) 
increases, the domestic profit losses from multilateral liberalization remain unchanged, but the 
potential profit gains in the previously protected PTA market could substantially rise because of 
                                                 
9  For a more rigorous formulation of the arguments presented here, see Andriamananjara (2000). 
10  As in the previous section, assume that producers’ profits play a decisive role in determining a country’s 
trade policies.  That is, the gains and losses of domestic producers drive decisions regarding trade 
liberalization.  It should be pointed that in a pure welfare sense trade diversion can be quite harmful to the 
member countries as it shifts the sourcing from an efficient to a non-efficient supplier.  Additionally, the 
tariff revenue losses could be important.     8 
the leveling of the playing field.  Given these different effects, one can deduce the following.   
•  The larger the degree of preference between the PTA members, the larger is the excluded 
country’s support for large multilateral liberalization.  
  This is the basic idea of the “competitive liberalization” argument.  Proponents of that 
approach have forcefully argued that WTO members would be hard-pressed to co-operate in the 
Doha round since many of them would lose heavily if those talks failed and the United States and 
the EU were “forced” to continue their preferential paths. 
  Just as in the previous section, this argument is in part valid, but it fails to recognize that 
countries that already belong to the PTA do not have the same incentives as the excluded 
economies.  To get the full picture, consider a representative firm in one of the PTA members.  
Multilateral trade liberalization has three distinct effects on the profits of that firm: (i) it decreases 
the profits it makes in the local market as domestic protection are reduced, causing more 
competition from abroad, (ii) it increases the profits it makes in non-members’ markets though 
better market access, and (iii) depending on the preference margin, it may or may not increase the 
profits it makes in the other PTA member.   
  When the degree of preference is high, the domestic firm already has a privileged access 
to the other member’s market so that the profit gain from multilateral liberalization in that 
country is likely to be low.  It may even be negative because producers from the non-member 
countries can start exporting duty free into that previously restricted market.  This makes the 
insiders more reluctant to undertake large multilateral liberalization: the more preference an 
insider gives and gets from other insiders, the less market access it is willing to give and get from 
the outsiders.   
  Most countries pursuing regional initiatives are attracted by open markets and, more 
precisely, by preferentially open markets.  It is the economic rents stemming from trade diversion 
that those countries find so appealing in preferential deals.  To pursue MFN liberalization entails 
forgoing those rents, and would likely be resisted.  It is perfectly conceivable that countries like   9 
Mexico or Chile, which already enjoy privileged access to the two largest markets in the world 
(the United States and the EU), lose interest in or even resist a multilateral trade deal that will 
dilute their preferential access to these markets.  In a consensus-based forum like the WTO, the 
reluctance of a couple of countries could be much more decisive than another country’s strong 
leadership.  The resulting policy implication is straightforward. 
•  An increase in the degree of preference in the PTA can reduce a PTA member’s 
willingness to undertake large multilateral trade liberalization.   
  A number of academic economists have reached this conclusion, and it has even been 
asserted that, given sufficient trade is diverted away from non-members, multilateral 
liberalization that was feasible before the PTA can cease to be so afterwards.




In the last five years, the EU has completed PTA negotiations with South Africa, Mexico, Chile, 
Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Jordan, Tunisia, Israel, Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, and Lebanon.  It is in 
the process of finalizing negotiations with MERCOSUR, Syria, and the economies of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council.  Across the Atlantic, the United States has, in 2003 alone, completed 
negotiations for PTAs with Chile and Singapore, and has started new ones with Australia, 
Morocco, five countries in Central America as well the five nations of the Southern Africa 
Customs Union (South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, Swaziland).   
  The prevailing trade policy doctrine of “competitive liberalization” contends that since 
multilateral liberalization is difficult, preferential deals should be adopted as a second best route 
to achieve broader liberalization.  Thus, the objective, is to use these bilateral PTAs (in 
conjunction with global and regional negotiations) to create momentum for trade policy.  This 
article examines whether these deals actually encourage evolution toward global free trade, or 
                                                 
11  See, for instance, Krishna (1998).   10 
whether they place impediments in its way and increase the likelihood of trade wars between 
competing trading blocs.   
  The discussions presented here are of theoretical nature and are based on admittedly 
stylized assumptions.  In practice, incentives vary from country to country, as well as for different 
types of PTAs.  Some PTAs have been established more for political reasons than for economic 
ones.  Keeping these limitations in mind, the preceding discussions could still be useful in 
thinking about the incentives of members and non-members and the implications of the recent 
proliferation of PTA on the global trading system.      
  One of the main results is that the “competitive liberalization” argument is generally 
correct with respect to the incentives of the excluded countries, in the sense that PTAs induce 
them to seek accession to existing blocs and/or to support broader multilateral liberalization.  
Preferential initiatives seem to be able to build political momentum for multilateral liberalization 
in the excluded countries.  In fact, it was demonstrated that if it was only up to the non-member 
countries, the preferential route will unquestionably lead to global free trade.   
  The argument, however, fails to look at the incentives of the PTA members.  Using 
simple economic logic, this article shows that the expansion of a PTA may not converge to global 
free trade because, at some point, member countries will refuse to admit new members.   
Similarly, it is demonstrated that an increase in the margin of preference in the PTA can reduce 
its member’s willingness to undertake large multilateral trade liberalization.  Intuitively, countries 
pursuing preferential initiatives are generally attracted by “preferential” market access.  They are 
chasing the economic rents resulting from the trade diversion associated with the preference (or 
discrimination).  MFN liberalization lowers the margin of preference and entails forgoing those 
rents.  Thus, it is likely to be resisted by PTA members.  This implies that the more a PTA is trade 
diverting, the more it is likely to be an obstacle to multilateral negotiations.  Numerous observers 
have noted that recent PTAs are bilateral and tend to create more exclusivity than openness (i.e., 
they tend to be trade diverting).    11 
  This last point is rather disturbing.  On the one hand, difficulty and slow progress in 
multilateral liberalization seems to have led to the current proliferation of preferential 
arrangements.  On the other hand, the discussions in this article indicate that those arrangements 
themselves may render multilateral liberalization more difficult and less feasible.  If those points 
are both true, the outlook is rather bleak: Choosing the preferential route as the path of least 
resistance may lead the multilateral trading system into a vicious circle of competitive diversion – 
rather that a competitive liberalization.  Not only can PTAs divert trade from more efficient 
suppliers, but they could also potentially divert support for multilateral trade liberalization.  At 
the same time, the increasingly extensive resources required for negotiating and administrating 
PTAs may divert attention away from efforts at the multilateral level.   
  On a more positive note, this article has suggested at least two directions in which current 
rules of the game could be adapted in order to make regionalism more consistent with 
multilateralism. First, it was demonstrated that making PTAs adopt an “open membership” policy 
can indeed make regionalism a practical route towards global free trade.  Secondly, bloc 
expansion and merger can lead to global free trade if accompanied by decreases in the MFN 
tariffs facing the rest of the world (not necessarily to zero).  Thus, to be consistent with the goal 
of global free trade, PTAs should involve lowering external trade barriers and contain as much 
nondiscriminatory policies as possible.   
  PTAs should be designed to be conducive to greater openness rather than a vehicle for 
protection.  Accordingly, multilateral rules regarding PTAs (e.g., Article XXIV of GATT, the 
1979 Enabling Clause, and Article V of GATS) should be adjusted or, at least clarified, with the 
objective of minimizing trade diversions.  More importantly, WTO members should not lose sight 
of the superiority of global free trade over a world divided into competing trading blocs.  In that 
respect, recent U.S. proposals (elimination of all tariffs on agricultural and industrial trade, 
massive cuts in farm subsidies and liberalization of services) for Doha round of negotiations are 
ground for optimism.     12 
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